I investigate complementarity games played on graphs, which model negative externalities embedded in structures of interaction. On the complete graph, the traditional economic analysis applies: the number of agents playing one strategy is proportional to its payo¤. I show that, in general and contrary to coordination games, the structure crucially in ‡uences the equilibria. On an important class of graphs, called bipartite graphs, the equilibria do not depend on strategies' payo¤s. On certain highly asymmetric graphs, an increase in the payo¤ of a strategy even decreases the number of agents playing this strategy. In most cases, equilibria do not maximize welfare.
Introduction
In this paper, I analyze complementarity games played on graphs. Complementarity games model negative externalities, i.e., an increase in the number of agents playing one action decreases the relative payo¤ of this action. Games played on graphs model local and social interactions, i.e., each agent only interacts with a subset of the whole population. Hence, complementarity games played on graphs model situations where a negative externality is embedded in a structure of interaction. To illustrate such situations, let me present three stylized examples.
First, consider international trade and specialization. Assume that countries have to specialize in producing either primary or secondary commodities, and that trade mostly occurs between countries having di¤erent specializations. If costs associated with distance are high, two countries trade only when they are geographic neighbors. One activity, say producing secondary commodities, may be a priori more pro…table than the other activity.
Nonetheless, the more countries specialize in secondary commodities, the higher the relative payo¤ of specializing in primary commodities.
Second, consider localized pollution. Assume that cities use a clean or a dirty technology to produce a good, say transportation. The dirty technology generates pollution that partly di¤uses to the neighboring environment. In isolation, a city prefers to use the dirty technology. However, the social cost associated with pollution is convex. Higher levels of ambient pollution increase the damages induced by an additional amount of pollution, thus increases the cost of using the dirty technology. The more the other cities use the dirty technology, the lower the incentive to use it.
Third, consider goods related to social distinctiveness. Assume that society is composed of nonconformists. Clothing may be formal or casual, and partly de…nes people's identity.
Since individuals are non conformists, they want to di¤erentiate themselves from their acquaintances. Everybody may have a di¤erent set of people to whom they compare. The more people dress formally, the higher the relative utility of dressing casually. 1 1 "Snob" goods are goods for which the demand decreases when others demand more of it, see Lebenstein These three examples share two common aspects. The more the others choose an action, the lower the payo¤ of this action relative to the other action. Also agents do not interact uniformly with everybody else. The structure of interaction may be geographic, as in the case of trade and pollution, or social, as for clothing. The central question addressed by the paper is the following. When a negative externality is embedded in a structure of interaction, how do agents' choices depend on the payo¤s and on the structure? Does the structure of interaction marginally change the traditional analysis of negative externalities or fundamentally modify it?
The central conclusion of the paper is that structure fundamentally modi…es the economic analysis of negative externalities. As a …rst illustration of the results, let me contrast the outcomes obtained on two very di¤erent graphs: the complete graph and the star. The complete graph models traditional situations where everybody interacts with everybody else. On the complete graph in equilibrium, the number of people playing one strategy is simply proportional to the relative payo¤ of the strategy. If a strategy's payo¤ increases, the number of agents playing this strategy increases proportionally. On the contrary, the star is a centered structure: one agent, called the center, is linked with all the other agents, and all the other agents, called border agents, are only linked with the center. On the star in equilibrium, all the border agents have to play the strategy opposite from what the center plays. This is independent of the payo¤s of the game.
Hence, on certain structures, choices of the agents do not depend on the actions' payo¤s, but only on the structure itself. The star is not an isolated example, and I characterize the class of graphs on which this property holds. These graphs, called bipartite graphs, are the graphs on which everybody can be di¤erent from all their neighbors. On bipartite graphs, the e¤ect of the structure is su¢ciently strong to completely remove the in ‡uence of the payo¤s. On certain other graphs, the structural e¤ect may even be so strong that it reverses the payo¤s' e¤ect. I present a speci…c class of graphs on which an increase in the relative payo¤ of one strategy decreases the number of agents playing this strategy. These graphs (1950) . Desire for individual di¤erentiation plays a critical role in fashion, e.g., Simmel (1904 ), Benvenuto (2000 .
illustrate what may happen on highly asymmetric structures, in which few agents possess numerous connections while most agents have few connections.
This analysis relates to a growing literature concerned with the interplay between economic incentives and social structure. As done here, one strand of this literature relies on the assumption that interaction structure is …xed and frames the choices of the agents. 2 On the one hand, interaction structure may convey information between agents. Montgomery (1991) investigates incentives that …rms have to hire through referral networks, in the presence of adverse selection on workers' ability. Bala and Goyal (1998) study bayesian learning occuring through graphs. Chwe (2000) analyzes how communication networks in ‡uence collective action.
On the other hand, and as done in this paper, the interaction structure may enter directly into agents' utilities. A lot of attention has been paid to coordination games played on graphs. Morris (2000) analyzes the prospect of contagion on graphs with in…nite number of agents and bounded number of links per agent. Coordination games played on graphs have especially been studied within evolutionary game theory. In most settings, when everybody interacts with everybody, all agents eventually coordinate on the risk-dominant strategy, e.g., Young (1993) , Kandori et al. (1993) , Blume (1999) . This result generalizes to regular local interaction structures, see Ellisson (1993) , Blume (1993 Blume ( , 1995 , and even to arbitrary symmetric graphs, see Young (1998) . The structure of interaction a¤ects the Nash equilibria of the game and the pace of convergence of the evolutionary process, but generally not the stochastically stable state. Even when interacting through a graph, everybody eventually coordinate on the risk-dominant strategy.
3 2 Another branch of this literature analyzes the incentives agents have to form and sever links with others, and the properties of emerging structures, e.g., Jackson and Watts (1997) , Bala and Goyal (2000) , Kranton and Minehart (1998) , see also conclusion.
3 Bergin and Lipman (1996) showed that in general, stochastic stability was highly dependent on the tremble process. Nonetheless, Blume (1999) showed that coordination on the risk-dominant strategy was the only stochastically stable state for a large class of trembles, when everybody interacts with everybody.
On arbitrary graphs, this is true for log-linear trembles, see Young (1998) , but not for uniform trembles, e.g., Jackson and Watts (1999) .
I provide the counterpart of the analysis of coordination games played on graphs for complementarity games played on graphs. In my analysis, I use the framework developed by game theorists to study coordination games played on graphs, as presented in chapter 6 of Young (1998) . The stage game is a 2 by 2 symmetric game. Complementarity games have two pure strategy Nash equilibria, in which one agent plays one strategy and the other agent plays the other strategy. Agents are linked through a symmetric unweighted graph, representing the structure of interaction. Agents play the 2 by 2 complementarity game with all the other agents with whom they are linked, and earn the sum of the payo¤s of all these plays.
4
The resulting game is a n by n game depending on the 2 by 2 game and on the graph.
My central goal is to study how the Nash equilibria of this resulting game are determined by the payo¤s of the complementarity game and by the graph. As for coordination games, complementarity games played on graphs usually have numerous Nash equilibria. This raises a serious problem of equilibrium selection. However, the game possesses an exact potential function in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Maxima of the potential are salient equilibria of the game, notably because they are the stochastically stable states for log-linear tremble, see Blume (1993) , Young (1998) . Therefore, I focus on potential maximization to study the equilibria of the game.
In the economic literature, little attention has been paid to complementarity games. Schelling (1978) early provided rigorous analysis of negative externalities. Complementarity games when everybody interacts with everybody have been analyzed by Kandori et al. (1993, section 6), and Canning (1995, section 5) . Blume (1993, p.398) , notices that on the in…nite line, some Nash equilibria of a certain complementarity game are insensitive to variations in payo¤s. All these results are encompassed and generalized in my analysis. 5 4 A key assumption is that agents play the same strategy with all their social neighbors. This assumption is standard and natural in the present context. 5 Theoretically, complementarity games played on graphs are related to spin glasses systems from statistical physics with pure antiferromagnetic interaction. The central notion characterizing systems with
antiferrromagnetic interaction is what physicists call 'frustration'; see Stein (1988) for an introduction to spin glasses systems.
In the preliminary section 2, I describe two by two complementarity games and the type of economic and social situations they allow one to model. This is a complementarity game, in which the equilibria do not Pareto dominate coordination on Clean. 7 The global welfare, de…ned as the sum of the payo¤s, is even highest when both cities choose the Clean technology. This game is akin to the Hawk-Dove game studied by biologists, see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, ch. 6 .1). In some sense, the Polluting city exploits the Clean city. In summary, complementarity games represent situations of complementary production and exploitation.
3 Symmetric 2 by 2 games played on symmetric graphs Consider a society of n agents, denoted by i: Agents are embedded in a social network, modelled as a symmetric unweighted graph g. The link between agent i and agent j is denoted by g ij . The symmetry of g means that 8i; j; g ij = g ji . The assumption that g is unweighted means that 8i; j; g ij 2 f0; 1g: Agent i and agent j are social neighbors when g ij = 1. Moreover, I assume that 8i; g ii = 0: There is no private utility, agents only get utility from interacting with others. 8 Finally, I assume that there is no isolated individual, 7 In general, if c denotes the cost of the Clean technology, C1 the pollution cost when only one city uses the Polluting technology and C2 the pollution cost when both cities use the Polluting technology, the resulting game is one of complementarity i¤
Welfare is highest when both cities choose the Clean technology i¤ c < 2C 1 8 All these assumptions are discussed in conclusion.
everyone is connected with someone else.
Each agent i chooses a strategy x i 2 fA; Bg: Let x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 fA; Bg n be the vector of strategies, called the state of the system. Each agent plays the game ¡ with all his social neighbors, and earns the sum of the utilities of all these plays. I denote by u i (x) the utility of agent i. By de…nition,
Payo¤s u i de…ne a n player game, denoted by ¡ g ; depending on the 2 player game ¡ and on the graph of interaction g. In short, ¡ g is the game ¡ played on the graph g.
Given a strategy vector x and a graph g, I denote by n A the number of agents playing A, by n i the number of social neighbors of i, by n i (A) the number of neighbors of i playing A, by n(AA) the number of links between agents playing A, and by n(AB) the number of links connecting one agent playing A and one agent playing B. Similar de…nitions apply to n B ; n i (B); and n(BB). Abusing notation, de…ne A = fi 2 [1; n] : x i = Ag and B = fi 2
Equivalently,
j2A g ij and n(AB) = P i2A;j2B g ij Note the straightforward following relations:
the total number of links of the graph g.
The potential function
Because of the symmetric form of the game and the graph, ¡ g is an exact potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) . This means that all the individual utilities are aligned with the same 'collective' function, called potential, which provides a powerful device to study the equilibria of the game.
Proposition 3.1 (Young, 1998) For any symmetric two by two game ¡ and symmetric graph g; the n player game ¡ g is an exact potential game with potential function
Compare this di¤erence in u i with the di¤erence in the potential:
Since the graph is symmetric n(AA)(A; x ¡i ) ¡ n(AA)(B; x ¡i ) = n i (A) and similarly,
As for any potential game, Nash equilibria of ¡ g are local maxima of the potential and The potential gives a natural way to reduce the multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Maxima of the potential are stochastically stable states of the myopic best-reply process of ¡ g under the log linear perturbation, see Appendix 1. Therefore, maxima of the potential are salient equilibria of the game and I will focus my analysis on them.
Finally, note that an agent with more connections (high n i ) has more in ‡uence on the potential, hence on the equilibria. This happens because agents' choices enter the potential function through the numbers of links n(AA) and n(BB). This property is important, and may be crucial to understand certain counterintuitive results, see Example 4.1 below. In general, ¡ g may have numerous Nash equilibria, but has only one highest potential equilibrium. If two subgroups of agents have high intra group connections and comparatively low inter group connections, everybody playing A in the …rst subgroup and everybody playing B in the second subgroup can be sustained as an equilibrium. Both strategies coexist when the graph naturally splits in two groups. However, there is only one equilibrium maximizing the potential: everybody plays the risk dominant strategy, see Young (1998) .
Coordination games
This result holds for any graph of interaction g. To see this, note that for coordination
This expression is an equality if and only if n(BB) = n(AB) = 0, which means that everybody plays A: Therefore, everybody playing the risk-dominant strategy is the unique global maximum of the potential for coordination games.
Complementarity games
Suppose that ¡ is a complementarity game, i.e., a < d and b < c. Equivalently, pure strategy strong Nash equilibria of ¡ are (A; B) and (B; A): In this section, I analyze how the equilibria of ¡ g depend on the game ¡ and the 9 There are natural symmetries between complementarity games played on graphs and coordination games played on graphs, that I explore in Appendix 2.
graph g. A central result is that, contrary to coordination games, the graph g crucially determines the highest potential equilibria.
Let me introduce an additional notation. As de…ned above,
is the probability of playing A in the mixed Nash equilibrium of ¡, i.e., p is the probabiltiy of playing A that makes the other player indi¤erent between the two strategies. I de…ne
as the ratio of the relative payo¤ of playing A against B over the relative payo¤ of playing B against A: M > 1 is equivalent to p > 1=2 and means that playing A against B is preferred to playing B against A: In short, A is preferred to B:
I develop my analysis as follows. First, I describe the equilibria for the complete graph.
This case corresponds to the traditional economic situation with decreasing returns when everybody interacts with everybody. Second, I introduce bipartite graphs and show that the equilibria on bipartite graphs do not depend on the payo¤s of the game. Third, I
investigate the situation for general graphs. Maximization of the potential is related to a well-known hard combinatorial optimization problem called MAX CUT. I characterize the set of Nash equilibria when the relative payo¤ of one strategy is much higher than the payo¤ of the other strategy. I provide comparative statics analysis for …xed graphs when payo¤s evolve and give examples of graphs on which an increase in the bene…t of playing A actually decreases the number of people playing A: Fourth, I provide a welfare analysis of the game. In most cases, highest potential equilibria do not maximize welfare. Fifth and …nally, I study the mixed equilibria of the game. I characterize them and show that they do not maximize the potential.
Complete graph
Consider the complete graph, i.e., 8i 6 = j; g ij = 1. The complete graph models situations where everybody interacts uniformly with everybody else.
Proposition 4.1 On the complete graph, Nash equilibria of ¡ g are states where the proportion of agents playing A is 'almost' equal to the mixed equilibrium probability p. All these equilibria are global maxima of the potential. Therefore, a state with k players playing A is an equilibrium if and only if
This is equivalent to (n ¡ 1)p · k · (n ¡ 1)p + 1 and to
There is at least one solution and at most two. There are two solutions if and only if Alternatively, we can use the potential:
As a function on the whole interval [0; n]; ' is concave and takes its unique maximum value
Maximum values of ' for integers are attained for the integer(s) closest to k ¤ : This yields the same solution as above. Moreover, if there are two closest integers, they have the same potential. Thus, all the equilibria have the same potential. QED.
For instance, when p is close to 1 (speci…cally, p > 1 ¡ 1=n), the relative payo¤ of A is much higher than the relative payo¤ of B. In this case, Nash equilibria are states with one agent playing B and all the other agents playing A (see also Proposition 4.3).
Note that the state where all the agents play one strategy is never a Nash equilibrium of a complementarity game played on a graph. If all the neighbors of an agent play A, this agent has an incentive to play B, independently of the payo¤s.
When p = 1=2, A and B have the same relative payo¤. If n is even, equilibria are states with n=2 players playing A and n=2 players playing B. These equilibria are strong. If n is odd, equilibria are states with (n ¡ 1)=2 players playing one strategy and (n + 1)=2 players playing the other strategy. These equilibria are weak: players playing the majority strategy are indi¤erent. 10 Proposition 4.1 is similar to theorem 5 in Kandori et al. (1993) , and to the classical result in biology for a population playing the Hawk-Dove game, e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, ch.6.1) . This result corresponds to the usual economic situation of global decreasing returns. Agents reach their indi¤erence point between the two strategies. An increase of the relative payo¤ of A with respect to the relative payo¤ of B translates into a proportional increase of the number of people playing A. How does this traditional economic intuition apply when agents are embedded in a social network?
Bipartite graphs
A …rst element of the answer is that there is a general class of graphs, called bipartite graphs, on which highest potential equilibria do not depend on the payo¤s of the complementarity game. First, let us de…ne bipartite graphs, e.g., Bondy and Murty (1976) , ch.8. In other words, a graph is bipartite if there is a vector of strategy x such that n(AA) = n(BB) = 0: This implies that for every complementarity game ¡; '(¡; g; x) = 0: Reciprocally, if there is a complementarity game¡ and a vector of strategies x such that '(¡; g; x) = 0, it implies that n(AA) = n(BB) = 0; and the graph is bipartite. I now state the property of bipartite graphs.
1 0 A noteworthy consequence is that if n is odd, the myopic best-reply process P under the randomized tie-breaking rule is ergodic, see Appendix 1.
Proposition 4.2 Bipartite graphs are the graphs for which highest potential equilibria do not depend on the payo¤s of ¡. When a bipartite graph is connected, it has two highest potential equilibria symmetric to one another.
Proof: If the graph is bipartite, the potential is maximized for n(AA) = n(BB) = 0.
This occurs for any bipartition of the graph, which do not depend on the payo¤ of the complementarity game. Reciprocally, suppose that highest potential equilibria do not depend on the payo¤s of ¡: Consider a game for which M > n ¡ 1: Proposition 4.3 (see below)
implies that there cannot be a BB link in equilibrium, hence in highest potential equilibria. Now consider a game for which 1=M > n ¡ 1. This time, there cannot be a AA link in equilibrium. Therefore n(AA) = n(BB) = 0 and the graph is bipartite. Highest potential equilibria are the bipartitions of bipartite graphs. When a bipartite graph is connected, it has only two bipartitions: (A; B) and (B; A). QED.
On bipartite graphs, the number of people playing A does not depend on the payo¤s of ¡. This number is a structural parameter that only depends on the graph. Some bipartite graphs are symmetric (n A =n ¼ 1=2), and some are highly asymmetric (n A =n ¼ 0 and 1).
Numerous important graphs are bipartite, including stars, trees and lattices with nearest neighbor interaction. Bipartite graphs are the graphs on which everybody can be di¤erent from all their neighbors. When a graph is bipartite, two agents linked together cannot be both linked to a common third agent. (In other words, bipartite graphs do not have triangles). Bipartite graphs appear naturally in situations where agents are divided in two groups, for example buyers and sellers, or men and women. In this section, I show that …nding the maximum of the potential for an arbitrary graph is a hard problem unlikely to lead to closed form solutions. To obtain insights, I specify the question in three directions. How to maximize the potential when relative payo¤s are equal? How to maximize the potential when one strategy is highly preferred to the other strategy? For a given graph, how do maxima of the potential change when relative payo¤s change?
Some insights on the general situation
First, when relative payo¤s are equal, maximizing the potential is equivalent to …nding the minimum number of links that have to be severed from g to obtain a bipartite graph.
Equivalently, highest potential equilibria are bipartitions of maximal bipartite subgraphs of g. To see this, notice that max x2fA;Bg n '(¡; g; x) = ¡(d¡a) min x2fA;Bg n [n(AA)+Mn(BB)]:
When M = 1 maximizing the potential is equivalent to minimizing n(AA) + n(BB); which is the number of links between similar agents. The graph obtained from g by severing these links is bipartite. Therefore, maximizing the potential is equivalent to …nding the minimum number of links that have to be severed from g to obtain a bipartite graph. This number min x2fA;Bg n [n(AA) + n(BB)] is a measure of how far a graph is from being bipartite, that I call the frustration of the graph. 11 Moreover, remember that n(AA) + n(BB) = jgj ¡ n(AB): Thus, maximizing the potential is equivalent to maximizing n(AB); which is the number of links of the bipartite subgraph of g induced by the partition (A; B) . In other words, highest potential equilibria correspond to bipartitions of maximal bipartite subgraphs of g.
Reformulating maximization of the potential in graph theoretic terms should allow us to rely on results from graph theory to characterize highest potential equilibria. In fact, …nding the maximal bipartite subgraphs of a graph is a well known problem of combinatorial optimization called MAX CUT (with my notation, the 'cut' of the graph g by the partition A; B is n(AB)). A fundamental …nding of computer scientists is that MAX CUT is a NP-complete problem, see Garey and Johnson (1979) . 12 For our purposes, the fact that 1 1 Note that frustration and more generally minx2fA;Bgn[n(AA) + Mn(BB)] with M > 0 are increasing with respect to graph inclusion, hence are maximal for the complete graph. 1 2 In a few words, a problem is NP-complete when there is no algorithm that solves the problem in polynomial time (unless P=NP). MAX CUT is solvable in polynomial time for planar graphs, see Hadlock MAX CUT is NP-complete indicates that we are not likely to be able to obtain closed form descriptions of the highest potential equilibria in general. 13 Second, when the relative payo¤ of one strategy is much higher than the relative payo¤ of the other strategy, I obtain a simple characterization of the Nash equilibria of ¡ g .
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that M > n¡ 1, so that strategy A is highly preferred to strategy B. Nash equilibria of ¡ g are the states in which every agent is connected to an agent playing B and no two agents playing B are connected. to list all the Nash equilibria, when the relative payo¤ of one strategy is much higher than the relative payo¤ of the other strategy.
Third, I derive comparative statics result. For a given graph g, how do highest potential equilibria vary when the bene…t of playing A increase? (1975) . For general graphs, relatively good 'approximation' algorithms have been designed, see Goemans and Williamson (1995) . 1 3 When M 6 = 1, …nding the minimum of n(AA) + Mn(BB) is a problem that has not been studied by computer scientists, although is very probably NP-complete as well, Samir Khuller (2000, personal communication) . 1 4 In graph theoretic terms, the set of agents playing B is an 'independent' set of the graph g, maximal with respect to inclusion, see Bondy and Murty (1976, ch. 7) .
A …rst result is that there are graphs on which an increase in the bene…t of playing A actually decreases the number of agents playing A. To see this, de…ne the graph g n;k as follows. In the center, n agents are connected to each other through a complete graph. In addition, each of these central agents is connected with k other agents through one by one links (see Appendix 3 for a picture of g 4;2 ). The total number of agents is n + nk and the total number of links is n(n¡ 1)=2+nk: In equilibrium, every 'border' agent has to play the opposite strategy from the central agent with whom he is linked. Hence the contribution of border agents to the potential is 0, and maximizing the potential on g n;k is equivalent to maximizing the potential for the complete graph with n agents. From Proposition 4.1, we know that the number of agents playing A in the center is almost pn. Each of these agents induce k border agents to play B:
, n A is independent of the payo¤s of ¡ (even if the equilibria are not) and if k > 1, n A decreases when p increases.
Example 4.1 On g n;k when k > 1 the number of agents playing A in highest potential equilibria decreases when the bene…t of playing A increases.
How to understand this paradoxical result? g n;k is a particular graph in which most agents have few links and few agents have many links. Highly connected agents have more in ‡uence on the shape of the equilibria. On the subset of these highly connected agents, an increase in the payo¤ of A increases the number of agents playing A (center e¤ect). However, every highly connected agent who plays A induces several poorly connected agents to play B (border e¤ect). On the whole population, the border e¤ect may overcome the center e¤ect. Note that g n;k has a low frustration compared to the total number of agents. A low number of links determines the strategies played by the whole population.
Despite the previous example, one can still obtain regular monotonicity conditions. However, these conditions concern the links between agents instead of the agents themselves. We have:
This is equivalent to
Thus, when the relative payo¤ of a strategy increases, the number of links between agents playing this strategy increases and the number of links between agents playing the other strategy decreases, whereas the e¤ect on the number of agents playing the strategy is ambiguous.
Welfare analysis
I now provide a welfare analysis of ¡ g : For coordination games, tension between maximization of the potential and Pareto optimality is clear. If the risk dominant equilibrium of ¡ Pareto dominates the other equilibrium, highest potential equilibria of ¡ g are Pareto optimal, otherwise they are not. What is the counterpart of this tension for complementarity games? There are several ways to de…ne the social welfare associated with a vector of strategies x in the game ¡ g . In this paper, I focus on a simple way. I de…ne the welfare of a vector of strategies x, denoted W (x), as the sum of the utilities
States maximizing W are Pareto optimal, but the converse need not be true. Welfare is directly related to links of g: A link between two agents playing A generates for each of them a payo¤ of a. Therefore contribution of a AA link to welfare is 2a: Similarly, a AB link generates a payo¤ of c for the agent playing A and d for the agent playing B. Contribution of a AB link to welfare is c + d.
, and u i (B;
Using Lemma 4.1, one can see that welfare is associated with a certain potential function.
E¤ectively, since n(AA) + n(AB) + n(BB) = jgj,
The game¡ is derived from the game ¡ when both agents act as a single unit whose payo¤ is the sum of individuals' payo¤s. When playing¡, agents fully internalize the e¤ect of their decision on the global welfare. Welfare maxima of ¡ g are highest potential equilibria of¡ g : 15 This property allows one to derive several results.
First, if ¡ is a coordination game, maximizing welfare implies that when 2a
Second, note that¡ is not always a complementarity game. When (c + d)=2 < a,¡ admits (A; A) for unique Nash equilibrium, and the potential is maximized for everybody playing A (which is never a Nash equilibrium of a complementarity game played on a graph).
This situation corresponds to the games of exploitation and con ‡ict presented in section 2.
1 5 This provides an additional justi…cation to the study of the potential function and its maxima.
Third, on bipartite graphs highest potential equilibria do not depend on the payo¤s.
Thus, as soon as¡ is a complementarity game, i.e., max(a; b) < (c +d)=2, highest potential equilibria maximize welfare. 
Mixed equilibria
In this section, I examine the mixed equilibria of ¡ g : So far, I have focused on pure strategy equilibria: agents played A or B, but did not play a random mix of both strategies.
Perhaps surprisingly, mixed equilibria of ¡ g are much simpler to characterize than pure strategy equilibria. However, I show that no mixed equilibrium is a global maximum of the potential. This justi…es the focus on pure strategy equilibria, at least from the point of view of potential maximization.
Suppose that agents play mixed strategies, and denote by x i 2 [0; 1] the probability of agent i to play A. An equilibrium of ¡ g is mixed if 8i; x i = 2 f0; 1g: The expected utility of agent i is
As usual, agent i has a possible interest to randomize if and only if he is indi¤erent between the two strategies, i.e., @u i =@x i = 0. This is equivalent to
The potential function is usually de…ned for pure strategies. For mixed strategies, I
consider the expected value of the potential:
' is simply a polynomial of second degree in x: The …rst order derivative of ' with respect
Therefore, x is a mixed equilibrium of ¡ g if and only if the …rst order derivatives of ' at x are equal to 0. Using matrix notations, this can be rewritten as (a¡d)gx = (b¡c)g (1¡x),
where 1 denotes the vector of ones. This is equivalent to (a + b ¡ c ¡ d)gx = (b ¡ c)g1 and to g(x ¡ p:1) = 0: In other words, x ¡ p:1 is an element of Ker(g) = fu 2 R n : gu = 0g:
Could these mixed equilibria be global maxima of the potential? One has to check the second order conditions
Therefore, the Hessian of ' is proportional to g: The proportionality constant is positive for coordination games and negative for complementarity games. Remember that diagonal terms of g are equal to 0. This implies that T r(g) = 0, hence g is neither a positive semide…nite matrix, nor a negative semi-de…nite matrix (except for g = 0; the empty graph).
This means that maxima of ' cannot be interior solutions. To summarize these …ndings:
Proposition 4.6 x is a mixed equilibrium of ¡ g if and only if 8i; x i = 2 f0; 1g and x = p:1 + u; u 2 Ker(g): No mixed equilibrium is a global maximum of the potential.
Note that Proposition 4.6 is valid for complementarity games as well as coordination games.
Conclusion
As advocated by sociologists, e.g., Granovetter (1985) , Burt (1995) , and increasingly recognized by economists, e.g., Manski (2000) , social structure frames economic outcomes.
Increasing returns embedded in social networks underlie many economic and social situations. Game theorists have analyzed such positive externalities with coordination games played on graphs. The graph has a strong e¤ect on transitory situations, i.e., Nash equilibria, but not on long run outcomes, i.e., equilibria of highest potential. In this paper, I
have argued that decreasing returns embedded in social networks were equally important and much less studied. Such negative externalities model situations of complementarity, congestion, con ‡ict, and nonconformism embedded in geographic or social structures. I have investigated complementarity games played on graphs and shown that the graph had a strong e¤ect on long run outcomes.
I …rst give a summary of the results. On the complete graph, the number of agents playing one strategy is proportional to the relative payo¤ of this strategy. On bipartite graphs, highest potential equilibria do not depend on the payo¤s of the complementarity game. On arbitrary graphs, if strategies have the same relative payo¤s, highest potential equilibria correspond to bipartitions of maximal bipartite subgraphs. This is known to be a hard combinatorial optimization problem. When the relative payo¤ of one strategy is much higher than the relative payo¤ of the other strategy, Nash equilibria are the independent sets of the graph maximal with respect to inclusion. When the payo¤ of a strategy increases, the number of links between agents playing this strategy increases and the number of links between agents playing the other strategy decreases. This is not true for the agents themselves. On certain highly asymmetric graphs, an increase in the bene…t of playing a strategy decreases the number of agents playing this strategy. In most cases, highest potential equilibria do not maximize welfare.
I now discuss some possible extensions of the model. In the model, only two strategies are available. How to generalize to k¸3 strategies? The …rst di¢culty of this exercise would be to de…ne what complementarity games are when the number of strategies is greater than 2. For k strategies, graphs on which everybody can be di¤erent from their neighbors are graphs of 'chromatic number' less than or equal to k, see Bondy and Murty (1976, ch.8) .
Therefore, graphs of chromatic number less than or equal to k are certainly the graphs on which (certain) equilibria are insensitive to variations in payo¤s, hence would constitute the appropriate generalization of bipartite graphs.
My model is a model of pure negative externalities embedded in unweighted symmetric graphs and without private utilities. Agents could have private utilities v i (x i ) independent on choices of the others. Many models on social interactions assume that an individual's utility is the sum of a private and a social component, e.g., Durlauf (1997) . Multiplicity of equilibria usually appears when the magnitude of the social component is large enough.
Private utilities should decrease the in ‡uence of the structure. Another promising way to explore is the endogenization of the network. What happens when agents choose with whom they interact, rationally form and sever social links? Jackson and Watts (1999) and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (1999) study coordination games played on endogenous graphs. Two common conclusions of these two studies are that stochastically stable networks are (mostly) complete and, more surprisingly, coordination on the risk dominated strategy may become stochastically stable. Endogenizing the network for complementarity games would probably give a prominent role to (complete) bipartite graphs.
Appendix 1: the log-linear evolutionary process
In this appendix, I brie ‡y describe the log-linear evolutionary process and how it relates to the potential. 16 The myopic best-reply process associated with ¡ g is de…ned as follows.
At time t = 0, the system is in an initial state x 0 = (x 0 1 ; :::; x 0 n ): At time t + 1, an agent i is chosen at random with probability 1=n and reevaluates his choice. 17 If = A with probability 1=2 and B with probability 1=2:
I denote by P this stochastic process. P is a myopic best reply process with stochastic order of moves. P is a Markov process on the …nite set fA; Bg n : By construction, absorbing states of P are Nash equilibria of ¡ g . More precisely, absorbing states of P are weak equilibria of ¡ g under the inertial tie breaking rule and strong equilibria under the randomized one. Since ¡ is a potential game, every best reply increases the potential. This implies that from any initial con…guration, P converges to a Nash equilibrium of ¡ g with probability one. Using the terminology of Markov processes, the only recurrent classes of P are the absorbing states. In short, there is no cycle.
Perturbations of Markov processes have been used to investigate evolutionary selection of equilibria, e.g., Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993) . Following Blume (1993) and Young (1998) , I introduce the log-linear perturbation of P, denoted by P¯wherē > 0:
P¯is de…ned as P, except that if agent i is drawn, he chooses A with probability P¯has the nice property of being irreducible, i.e., there is positive probability of moving from any state to any other state in a …nite number of periods. On the contrary, P in general is not irreducible, because of the multiplicity of Nash equilibria of ¡ g . An irreducible
Markov process has a unique stationary distribution, i.e., a probability distribution over states invariant through the process. If ¹¯is the unique stationary distribution of P¯;
a state x is stochastically stable if lim¯! +1 ¹¯(x) > 0: Roughly, stochastically stable states are equilibria of ¡ stable under the log-linear perturbation.
The potential property greatly simpli…es the evolutionary analysis. In fact, the potential allows one to obtain an exact expression of the stationary distribution ¹¯of P¯.
8¯> 0; 8x 2 fA; Bg n ; ¹¯(x) = e¯' (x) = P y2fA;Bg n e¯' (y) (see Young (1998) , th. 6.1.). Therefore:
Proposition (Young, 1998, th. 6 .1) Stochastically stable states of ¡ g under the loglinear perturbation are maxima of the potential.
Of course, alternative perturbations of P could lead to di¤erent stochastically stable states. To give a simple example of this, consider the following tree with 13 agents and a complementarity game such that p = 1=2.. Second, a priori being di¤erent from people with whom you are linked should be related to being similar to people with whom you are not linked. To see how this intuition translates on the potential, denote by g c the complementary graph of g; i.e., 8i 6 = j; g c ij = 1 ¡ g ij ; and h the complete graph, i.e., 8i 6 = j; h ij = 1: In a matrix sense, g + g c = h. Notice that the potential function can be rewritten in a matrix formulation (see section 4.5)
where x is the vector such that x i = 1 if agent i plays A, x i = 0 if agent i plays B, and 1 denotes the vector of ones. Therefore, the potential is a linear function of the graph, and '(¡; g; x) = '(¡; h; x) ¡ '(¡; g c ; x) = '(¡; h; x) + '(¡; g c ; x)
The potential for a complementarity game played on a graph is the sum between the potential for the same complementarity game played globally and the potential of the as-sociated coordination game played on the complementary graph. Complementarity and coordination are dual notions, with respect to games and to graphs.
